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In 1978, top DOJ officials in the Carter Administration floated a revolutionary 
proposal that would have remade the consumer class action and, with it, the 
relationship of litigation and administration in the American regulatory state. At the 
proposal’s core was a “public action” for widespread small-damages claims that sought 
to replace Rule 23 with a hybrid public-private enforcement model. Similar to the 
False Claims Act, this new mechanism would have granted private plaintiffs the 
power to bring lawsuits on behalf of the United States and recover a finder’s fee if 
successful, but it also gave the DOJ substantial screening authority and control over 
such actions, including the ability to take over suits or dismiss them outright. Despite 
months of shuttle diplomacy among interest groups, a pair of bills in Congress, and 
full-scale committee hearings, this creative blend of private initiative and public 
oversight soon fizzled. Yet the story of the proposal’s rise and fall nonetheless provides 
a venue for wider reflection about American civil procedure and the political economy 
that produces it. Indeed, the failed revolution of 1978 reveals a contingent moment 
when the American litigation system was splintering into the pluralistic, chaotic one 
we now take for granted, including hard-charging state attorneys general, a federal 
administrative state with litigation authority independent of the DOJ, and a 
sophisticated and politically potent plaintiffs’ bar. In retrospect, the proposal may have 
been the last best chance to counter the centrifugal tendencies of an American state 
that was progressively empowering ever more institutional actors within the litigation 
system. Just as important, lurking in the background of the story of 1978 is the bracing 
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possibility that the Rules Enabling Act, for all its virtues in revising technocratic 
procedural rules, has systematically enervated efforts to address larger procedural 
design questions in an increasingly dense and interconnected regulatory world. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“No man is an Iland, intire of it selfe; every man is a peece of the 
Continent, a part of the maine . . . .”1 So began, with a Donne-ian flourish, 
Kalven and Rosenfield’s iconic 1941 article on the future of the “class suit.”2 
The article is rightly celebrated for the clarity of its vision and—written at 
the height of the New Deal—the zeitgeist-bucking power of its claim that 
FDR’s alphabet soup of agencies was ill-equipped to achieve sound 
administration of justice on its own.3 Rather, private civil enforcement—and, 
in particular, the “class suit”—should and would play a central role going 
forward. But lost in the celebrations of their prescience is a less noted 
contribution: Kalven and Rosenfield quietly indulged, and thus helped to 
cement, a presumption about the relationship between litigation and 
administration that has channeled, and distorted, our thinking about class 
actions and civil procedure more generally ever since. “The best solution,” 
they wrote, “is to draw upon both systems of enforcement, permitting both 
to develop side by side to check and complement each other.”4 Litigation and 
administration should, on this view, operate and evolve as parallel, separate means 
of civil law enforcement, serving as institutional rivals—not partners—in 
 
1 JOHN DONNE, DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS 98 (John Sparrow ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1923) (1624). 
2 Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 
U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 684 (1941). 
3 See id. at 686-88 (arguing that an enforcement method was necessary to alleviate group 
wrongs beyond joinder or administrative enforcement); Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the 
Administrative State: Kalven and Rosenfield Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 603 (2008) (noting that 
the article is “one of the most cited in the annals of . . . class action scholarship”). 
4 Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 2, at 721.  
2017] Jacobins at Justice 1533 
ambition-checking equilibrium.5 Contrary to the Donne-ian verse that headed 
their article, agency regulation and the “class suit” should thus very much 
remain separate islands—part of a broader regulatory archipelago for sure, 
but islands nonetheless. 
This presumption is now found virtually everywhere in debate about the 
role of litigation in the American regulatory state.6 It sits just below the 
surface in disputes about whether litigation and regulation function as 
substitutes or complements.7 It is implicit in a venerable law and economics 
literature that paints a stylized contrast between regulation and litigation and 
also between public and private enforcement, and argues for selective use of 
one over the other.8 It undergirds the deeper notion, sketched best by Sean 
Farhang, that private civil enforcement constitutes its own “litigation state” 
and is a distinct and deliberate form of state regulatory power.9 And, within 
the American legal tradition more generally, the “parallel” presumption both 
reflects and feeds a pervasive “institutional Diceyism,” as Daniel Ernest has 
put it,10 that courts and agencies follow different institutional logics and that 
only the courts or court-like procedures can achieve “rule of law” or safeguard 
due process against political incursions.11 
Not everyone buys in. A few scholars have argued that the better course is 
to combine litigation and administration in creative ways to produce a 
conjoined, not parallel, approach. The late Richard Nagareda proposed a 
 
5 Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 257 (James Madison) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008) 
(“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”). 
6 See Nagareda, supra note 3, at 648 (“The period since Kalven and Rosenfield’s 1941 Article has 
witnessed the elaboration in practice of the class action in parallel with the administrative state.”). 
7 See, e.g., Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, Regulation and Litigation: Complements or Substitutes?, 
in THE AMERICAN ILLNESS: ESSAYS ON THE RULE OF LAW 118, 118-34 (F.H. Buckley ed., 2013) 
(using data from insurance class actions to test if class action litigation is a substitute for regulation); 
Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, The Tradeoffs Between Regulation and Litigation: Evidence from 
Insurance Class Actions, 1 J. TORT L., no. 3, 2007, at 1, 1 (“Class actions function in a way similar to 
regulation. What is unclear is how the two systems fit together.”). 
8 See generally, e.g., ANDREI SHLEIFER, THE FAILURE OF JUDGES AND THE RISE OF 
REGULATORS (2012); REGULATION VERSUS LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND 
LAW (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2011); Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, 
and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus Public 
Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1980). But see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 
Public Enforcement of Law, in CRIMINAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 55 (Nuno Garoupa ed., 2009) 
(suggesting that institutional blends might be better). 
9 See generally SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND 
PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010). 
10 Daniel R. Ernst, The Politics of Administrative Law: New York’s Anti-Bureaucracy Clause and 
the O’Brian–Wagner Campaign of 1938, 27 L. & HIST. REV. 331, 334 (2009). 
11 See DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940 30-33 (2014) (discussing Dicey’s influential theories on the rule 
of law). 
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regime for resolving mass torts litigation in which an administrative agency 
would wield what amounted to negotiated-rulemaking powers.12 And a number 
of other scholars have proposed variants of agency “gatekeeping” whereby 
public agencies would be vested with the power to manage private litigation 
efforts, including the ability to take over control of particular lawsuits or 
dismiss them outright.13 Even Congress has, on occasion, entertained more 
innovative institutional blends: The Fair Labor Standards Act, the False Claims 
Act, and the “citizen suit” provisions that pervade federal environmental law 
all represent, to varying degrees, hybrid public–private frameworks.14 But these 
are rare exceptions. Indeed, looking out over our most consequential regulatory 
regimes and the debates that surround them, it is no stretch to say that litigation 
and administration have spent the decades since Kalven and Rosenfield first 
addressed the issue marooned on separate islands, while alternative 
institutional visions have remained hidden coves, tucked away from the 
swirling currents and crashing waves of criticism and reform. 
All of this presents a puzzle: Why, given the ready availability of 
alternative visions, has the parallel/island approach won out? And, to pose the 
question from the other direction, why has a conjoined—or blended, or 
hybrid—approach not gained more traction? 
One could start to search for answers by invoking some of the usual 
explanations for why American litigation and procedure look this way. Among 
these are the unique American embrace of due process and the silo-ed, “day in 
court” ideal that extends from it;15 an American rights tradition that produces 
 
12 See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 220-22 (2007) 
(describing a system in which “agencies may draw on recent experience with negotiated rulemaking, 
along with competition within the mass tort plaintiffs’ bar, to facilitate the design of” global settlements). 
13 See David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616, 620 nn.5-
6 (2013) (detailing other entries in this literature); Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of 
Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 976-1006 
(1994) (arguing that the SEC has the authority to “disimply” a private right of action under Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming 
Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 
10B-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1354-58 (2008) (discussing the benefits of giving the SEC the 
authority to prescreen Rule 10b-5 class action complaints); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation 
of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 95 
(2005) (“Congress’s best course of action often will be delegation to the appropriate executive 
department or agency of the power to create and delimit private rights of action.”). 
14 See Engstrom, supra note 13, at 646 tbl. 2 and accompanying discussion. 
15 See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (noting “our deep-rooted historic tradition 
that everyone should have his own day in court” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 
ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 47 (2001) (noting 
that adversarial legalism helped spur the development of due process norms); AMALIA D. KESSLER, 
INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGAL 
CULTURE, 1800–1877 6-8 (2017) (discussing the historical development of adversarial process within 
the American legal system); 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
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a dread of all government, but especially the bureaucratic variety;16 and a 
separation-of-powers constitutional structure that provides potent incentives 
for strategic legislators to channel exclusive regulatory power to the courts.17 
This brief essay, however, seeks a more concrete source of insight by focusing 
in on a relatively recent but mostly forgotten episode in the history of the 
American class action.18 In 1978, in the lull between the 1966 revisions to Rule 
23 and the class action wars of the 1980s and 90s, Congress considered a 
proposal from the now-defunct Office for Improvements in the Administration 
of Justice (OIAJ), a “think tank” created within the Carter Administration 
Justice Department (DOJ) that offered a radical reinterpretation of the class 
action lawsuit. 19 At the proposal’s core was a “public action” for “widespread 
small claims” situations that would have replaced much of Rule 23 with a hybrid 
public–private enforcement model—similar to the False Claims Act—that 
granted the DOJ substantial control over privately initiated lawsuits and 
allowed successful “relators” to earn a finder’s fee for their efforts.20 
Despite months of shuttle diplomacy among key interest groups, bills in 
the ninety-fifth and ninety-sixth Congresses, and full-scale committee 
hearings, this revolutionary “blend of private initiative with [] public 
responsibility,”21 as one of the proposal’s progenitors described the design, 
 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4449 (2d ed. 1987) (explaining that preclusion usually does not 
apply without a day in court). 
16 See JAMES A. MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH: POPULAR PARTICIPATION AND THE 
LIMITS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 1–9 (1990) (“Americans fear public power as a threat to liberty.”). 
17 See FARHANG, supra note 9, at 3 (arguing that the legislative choice between private 
litigation and administrative enforcement is a strategic one). 
18 At the time, the proposal drew substantial law review commentary. For discussion of the 
proposal to repeal Rule 23(b) and replace it with the proposed reinterpretation of the Office for 
Improvements in the Administration of Justice, see, e.g., Stephen Berry, Ending Substance’s Indenture 
to Procedure: The Imperative for Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 
299, 321 (1980); John E. Kennedy, Federal Class Actions: A Need for Legislative Reform, 32 SW. L.J. 1209, 
1212-16 (1979); George B. Mickum, III & Carol A. Rhees, Federal Class Action Reform: A Response to 
the Proposed Legislation, 69 KY. L.J. 799, 824-26 (1980); Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and 
Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem”, 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 684-93 (1979); 
Patricia L. Wells, Note, Reforming Federal Class Action Procedure: An Analysis of the Justice Department 
Proposal, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 543 (1979). More recent scholarly efforts have mentioned the 
proposal only in passing. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, An Opt-In Option for Class Actions, 115 MICH. L. REV. 
171, 180-81 (2016); David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 
1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 620-22 (2013); Laurens Walker, The Consumer Class Action Bill 
of Rights: A Policy and Political Mistake, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 849, 861-62 (2007). 
19 Nadine Cohodas, ‘Think Tank’ in Justice Dept. Earns Respect from Members, But Wins Passage of 
Few Bills, 38 CONG. Q. 1049, 1049-51 (1980). 
20 Reform of Class Action Litigation Procedures: Hearings on S. 3475 Before the Subcomm. on Judicial 
Mach. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 22-26 (1978) (statement of Hon. Griffin B. Bell, 
Att’y Gen. of the United States and Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States) 
[hereinafter Hearings] (explaining the “public action” and the “class compensatory action”). 
21 See id. at 12. 
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soon fizzled. The episode could thus be dismissed as merely a blip in the long 
and colorful history of the class action. But it was also one of those hinge 
moments when a range of evolutionary paths seemed open and, crucially, 
when key features of the modern-day American litigation landscape we now 
take for granted—active and powerful state attorneys general, federal 
agencies with litigation authority independent of the DOJ, and a well-heeled 
and specialized plaintiffs’ bar—were still largely in their embryonic stages. 
Looking back, the Justice Department officials who floated the proposal and 
then fought to will it into existence were procedural Jacobins, seeking the 
radical overthrow of a rapidly solidifying establishment order of things.22 
Their failure to carry the day was a decisive episode—the last best chance to 
shift Kalven and Rosenfield’s “parallel” paradigm. No telling of the history of 
Rule 23 and the American class action is complete without it. 
But, recovering the failed revolution of 1978 offers more than just an 
opportunity to recount a pivotal moment in class action history, for the 
revolutionaries inside the DOJ were not merely seeking a one-off change to 
the class action rules. They also sought to counter what they saw as an 
increasingly narrow rulemaking process and growing polyphony within the 
American regulatory state by bringing the executive branch more firmly into 
the picture and giving the DOJ in particular a central role in judicial 
administration. Viewed through this lens, the episode invites wider reflection 
and highlights the need for an institutional turn in our thinking about 
American civil procedure and the political economy that produces it. With 
the “class suit” a continuing subject of debate within the Advisory 
Committee, Congress, and elsewhere,23 the failure of 1978 serves as a 
reminder that alternative visions—including the kinds of institutional blends 
embodied by the DOJ proposal—are available and might just be the optimal 
 
22 Calling Meador and his team “Jacobins” is, of course, something of a historical finesse. As I set 
forth in more detail below, the term fits in the sense that the Jacobins sought to centralize state—especially 
executive—power during the French Revolution in a manner akin to Meador’s effort to centralize 
administrative authority over damages class actions. In addition, the Jacobins sought to rid France of the 
ancien regime in a manner akin to Meador’s effort to push back against a fast-emerging “establishment 
order” of interests within the American litigation state. And yet, it is worth noting that the Jacobins were 
the most radical revolutionaries and were responsible for The Terror of 1793–94. In that sense, the use of 
the term jars in light of Meador’s self-conscious effort to chart a middle course between the radical options 
of full litigant autonomy on the one hand and shutting down class actions entirely on the other. See 
WILLIAM DOYLE, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 189-420 (1989).  
23 For instance, the Committee’s most recent proposed amendments to Rule 23 were approved 
by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (the “Standing Committee”) on June 17, 2017 
and are currently pending review by the Judicial Conference. Assuming approval by the Conference 
and then the Supreme Court (and also no override by Congress), the new version of the rules will 
become effective December 1, 2018. Pending Rules and Forms Amendments, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/pending-rules-and-forms-amendments 
[https://perma.cc/5HNG-A4DB]. 
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approach. More generally, the episode suggests that civil procedure scholars 
should adopt a wider angle of vision than they typically have and develop a 
richer and more institutionally focused account of American procedural 
political economy that looks beyond the output of the rulemaking process 
prescribed by the Rules Enabling Act. Indeed, lurking in the background of 
the story of 1978 is the bracing possibility that the Enabling Act, for all its 
virtues in revising technocratic rules governing service of process, electronic 
discovery, and the like, has been a systematically enervating force when it 
comes to addressing larger procedural design questions in an increasingly 
dense and interconnected regulatory world. 
I. MAN ON THE BARRICADES 
From the start, Daniel Meador was a juggernaut. Within only weeks of his 
arrival at the DOJ from a faculty position at the University of Virginia School 
of Law, Meador had mapped out a “two-year program” listing no fewer than 
eighteen aspects of the judicial system in urgent need of reform, from revisions 
to pretrial and appellate procedures and an increase in the jurisdiction of 
magistrates to the promulgation of criminal sentencing guidelines and the 
creation of “alternatives to class actions as remedies for mass wrongs.”24 Meador 
was also in a unique—and, for a legal academic, downright dreamy—position to 
see them through. Tapped by Attorney General Griffin Bell to head up the 
Justice Department’s newly formed Office for the Improvement of the 
Administration of Justice (OIAJ)25, Meador suddenly found himself with 
organizational leverage—including a staff of thirty lawyers, economists, 
sociologists, and administrative support26—and the frequent ear of the Attorney 
General to pursue a wide range of law reform measures. 
 
24 Office for Improvements in the Admin. of Justice, A Program for Improvements in the 
Administration of Justice 1-2 (May 9, 1977), in the Papers of Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 1977–79 (on file at the University of Virginia Law Library, Special Collections, 
MSS 82-3b, Box 3) [hereinafter Meador Papers]; Office for Improvements in the Admin. of Justice, 
A Two-Year Program for Improvements in the Administration of Justice 1-5 (May 9, 1977) (on file 
at Meador Papers, MSS 82-3b, Box 3). For more on Meador’s nomination, see Press Release, Dep’t 
of Justice (Feb. 11, 1977) (on file at Meador Papers, MSS 82-3b, Box 5, Folder: “News Clippings Re: 
DJM 1977”). 
25 Anthony Marro, Assistants Picked by Bell Praised by Critics of His Own Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 7, 1977, at C26 (“[Bell’s] candidate to head a newly created division for the administration of 
justice is Daniel J. Meador.”). 
26 See Memorandum from Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Griffin Bell, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office for Improvements in the Admin. of Justice 11 
(Feb. 22, 1977) (on file at Meador Papers, supra note 24, MSS 82-3b, Box 3, Folder: “General 
Memoranda, 1976–1978”) (stating “the location of the Office under the Attorney General provides 
him with a ready means of marshalling a distinctive aggregation of professions and minds to meet 
unexpected difficulties”). 
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But Meador was driven to give up a comfortable academic life by a more 
deeply felt—and non-programmatic—set of beliefs. Even as he lost his 
eyesight because of a rare retinal condition,27 Meador served as the unofficial 
leader of a cohort of DOJ officials who articulated a sharply drawn vision of 
the proper role of the executive branch, and the DOJ in particular, in the 
administration of justice. Two premises underpinned their view. One was the 
importance of institutional perspective. The “American justice system,” 
Meador wrote in an unusual long-form memo to Attorney General Bell, is “a 
large, complex, interrelated collection of agencies, officials, and private 
professionals.”28 While the justice system’s “centerpiece” was plainly the 
courts, judges lacked the will and capacity, given their narrow focus on 
deciding cases, to engage in meaningful “law reform” activities.29 Instead, it 
was the executive branch—and, more specifically, the DOJ—that was best 
positioned “to see the problems of our justice system from a broad 
perspective” and to corral an increasingly sprawling cast of public and private 
actors, from federal and state prosecutors and agency administrators to the 
plaintiffs’ bar and a growing corps of arbitrators and mediators.30 The Justice 
Department could serve, he would later write, as “a unique bridge” and the 
sole institution within the federal government capable of “cutting across lines 
that otherwise are sharply defined by the separation of powers.”31 
The second premise was that, to serve this bridge function, the DOJ 
would require extensive restructuring. Some proposals sought to insert the 
DOJ more fully into judicial administration via new interbranch 
arrangements. A perennial idea was the establishment of a Federal Judicial 
Council to oversee the courts, composed of the Chief Justice, an Article III 
judge appointed by the Judicial Conference, the Attorney General, the Vice 
President, and the chairpersons of the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees.32 Other reforms would have paved the way for a central DOJ 
 
27 Ronald J. Ostrow, Loss of Sight Doesn’t Stop Assistant Attorney General, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 
1977, at I7. 
28 Memorandum from Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Griffin 
Bell, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Office for Improvements in the Admin. of Justice and 
the Federal Justice Research Program—Their Role and Future in the Department of Justice 2 (Jan. 
17, 1979) (on file at Meador Papers, supra note 24, MSS 82-3b, Box 3, Folder: “General Memoranda, 
1976–1978”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
29 Id. at 2, 5.  
30 Id. at 1.  
31 Daniel J. Meador, Role of the Justice Department in Maintaining an Effective Judiciary, ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI., Jul. 1982, at 136, 137. 
32 See Memorandum from Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Creation of a Federal Justice Council 1 (July 18, 
1977) in the Subject Files of Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 1977–1979 (on file at 
the National Archives, RG60 (“General Records of the Department of Justice”), Box 92, Folder: 
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role in judicial administration by splitting the DOJ in two, with a politically 
insulated Attorney General to serve as “chief legal officer” and a separate 
Secretary of Justice—not unlike European Ministers of Justice—to perform 
all other non-lawyering administrative and political duties, including 
overseeing the Department’s newly expanded policy-analytic capacities.33 
Still other proposals at the time were more pedestrian: The DOJ could only 
use its superior institutional position to improve the administration of justice 
if it possessed “centralized litigation control.”34 Of particular concern were 
growing congressional grants of independent litigation authority to federal 
agencies, with some twenty-six of them (and counting) now conducting their 
own litigation under statutory provisions providing for exclusive or 
concurrent litigation authority.35 The situation, Bell himself noted in a 
speech, was “rapidly becoming chaotic,” with “individual [congressional] 
committees pushing out legislation to give their favored agencies some degree 
of independence from the Attorney General’s control.”36 
 
“Federal Justice Council”) [hereinafter Griffin Files], describing the suggested composition of the 
proposed Federal Justice Council. 
33 See Memorandum from J. Michael Kelly, Counselor to Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Improving the Role of the Attorney 
General as Counselor and Litigator 11-13, 19-25 (June 12, 1979) (on file at Griffin Files, supra note 
32, Box 121, Folder: “Office for Improvements & Adm. of Jus.”); Memorandum from Daniel J. 
Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Draft Thoughts File, Role of the Attorney 
General 4-5 (Aug. 4, 1978) (on file at Meador Papers, supra note 24, MSS 82-3e, Box 5) (discussing 
the dual role of the Attorney General and the inability to complete both without conflicts of time 
or substance). On European models of judicial administration, see JOHN BELL, JUDICIARIES 
WITHIN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW 50-51, 112-13 (2006), describing judicial management 
in France and Germany, respectively. For an account of the differing roles of the U.S. and U.K. 
attorneys general at the time, see generally Robert Kramer & Nathan Siegel, The Attorney General 
of England and the Attorney General of the United States, 1960 DUKE L.J. 524 (1960). For an updated 
account of the U.K. system, see generally Kate Malleson, Judicial Reform: The Emergence of the Third 
Branch of Government, in REINVENTING BRITAIN: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE UNDER NEW 
LABOR 133 (Andrew McDonald ed., 2007). As a final note, Meador was not writing on a blank slate 
in advocating for an American Ministry of Justice. As far back as 1921, then-Judge Cardozo had 
made a similar call to create a Ministry of Justice in order to mediate between Congress and the 
courts, which were otherwise prone to move in “proud and silent isolation.” Benjamin N. Cardozo, A 
Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 114 (1921). 
34 See Memorandum from Terrence B. Adamson, Special Assistant to Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, to Michael Egan, Assoc. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, et al., 8 (Sept. 29, 1977) (on 
file at Griffin Files, supra note 32, Box 85, Folder: “Litigating Authority”). 
35 Id. at 5. 
36 Id. at 7. Note that this language is drawn from a draft speech, the final version of which is 
not part of the archival record.  But Bell made a full-length version of the argument that regulatory 
agencies should not enjoy independent litigation authority in a lecture at Fordham Law School in 
March 1978 that was subsequently published in full. Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal 
Government’s Chief Lawyer and Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049 
(1978). In it, Bell criticized Congress for making “grants of separate litigating authority” and 
pointedly concluded that he did “not favor the independence of these regulatory agencies…in legal 
matters.” Id. at 1057-58. 
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If Meador and his comrades were ambitiously seeking to remake the 
litigation system and the DOJ’s role in it, then his decision that OIAJ would 
give “top priority”37 to overhauling the class-action system was perhaps his 
boldest move of all. Meador was hardly alone in his view that the class action 
system was foremost among the parts of the justice system requiring 
attention. Early rumblings came just a few years after the 1966 amendments 
to Rule 23 went into effect when three influential national bar organizations 
issued highly critical reports.38 Anxieties continued to rise in the business and 
academic press.39 But soon alarm bells began to ring out from the bench, 
including no less an eminence than Judge Henry Friendly, who argued in 1973 
that the system needed “urgent attention.”40 By the time Meador arrived at 
OIAJ in 1977, a crisis mentality had taken over. An April 1977 survey 
administered by the Advisory Committee—which had begun to consider 
revisions to Rule 23—found that a majority of federal judges thought that the 
 
37 See Memorandum from Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Class Actions (Apr. 18, 1977) (on file at Meador 
Papers, supra note 24, MSS 82-3e, Box 7). 
38 See SPECIAL COMM. ON CONSUMER LEGISLATION, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW TO THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ON CONSUMER 
PROTECTION LEGISLATION (1970 unofficial); AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RULE 23 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE (1972); SECTION OF CORP., BANKING, AND BUS. LAW OF THE AM. BAR 
ASS’N, RECOMMENDATION REGARDING CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS FOR MONETARY RELIEF, 
29 BUS. LAW. 957 (1974). 
39 For the business press, see, e.g., The Chilling Impact of Litigation, BUSINESSWEEK, June 6, 1977, 
at 58, 62, which describes the class action as the “principal ‘villain’ in the rise of litigiousness”; see also 
Eleanore Carruth, The “Legal Explosion” Has Left Business Shell-Shocked, FORTUNE, Apr. 1973, at 65, 66 
(discussing the increased legal exposure as a result of the 1966 amendments that allegedly drove 
corporations to hysteria). For academic misgivings, see, e.g., Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., The Class Action 
as an Antitrust Enforcement Device: The Chicago Experience (II), 1 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 1273, 1273 
(1976), discussing the increased burdensomeness of antitrust class actions compared to nonclass 
antitrust cases; see also Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust 
Suits—The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1971) (“The procedural 
innovation which has had the most dramatic repercussions has been the 1966 amendment of the class 
action provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Developments in the Law—Class 
Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1323 (1976) (noting “the result of the rulemakers’ [of the 1966 
amendments] efforts is a hodgepodge of pragmatic and occasionally conflicting objectives”); Bruce I. 
Bertelsen et al., Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 GEO. L.J. 1123, 1123 (1974) 
(noting “[t]he class action device is the object of a controversy that has mushroomed since the 1966 
amendment of rule 23”); Jerrold B. Reilly, Comment, Mass Compensatory Relief: The Inadequacy of the 
Class Action & the Need for Procedural Alternatives, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1341, 1359 (1973) (stating the 
“b(3) class action provision [is] one of the most controversial in the Federal Rules”). 
40 HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973). 
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steady growth of class action filings was causing serious problems.41 Even 
Congress had begun to stir on the issue.42 
But class action reform was also a dangerous place to start, for the class 
action device sat squarely at the center of a much broader and deeply divisive 
debate about the evolving American litigation system. A crystallizing 
moment came in 1976 when the National Conference on the Causes of 
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (dubbed the 
“Pound Conference” as a self-conscious sequel to Roscoe Pound’s iconic 1906 
speech to the American Bar Association by the same title) was convened.43 
Class actions, the conference proceedings made plain, were really just one 
piece of a rapidly coalescing concern about litigation costs, access to justice, 
and the role of lawsuits in an American regulatory state that increasingly 
relied on court- and litigation-centered enforcement. Given the class action’s 
visceral centrality to that debate, Meador would soon realize that its reform 
was “the most difficult and substantial project we have tackled.”44 
II. A REVOLUTIONARY PROPOSAL 
The draft class action bill that OIAJ circulated to 1,000 members of the 
bench and bar in December 1977 after a year of intensive analysis and interest 
group work reflected Meador’s view that, given the political realities, it was 
better to “revamp [the] procedure in a comprehensive way, not by piecemeal 
pruning here and there.”45 Consistent with that view, the proposal repealed 
 
41 See Responses to the Rule 23 Questionnaire of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, reprinted in 
5 CLASS ACTION REP. 1, 1-19 (1978). For a description of class action growth during this time, see 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 35 (1974) 
(reporting that, as of the end of 1973, some 4,622 class actions were pending, accounting from some 
4.4 percent of civil cases in the federal system); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, SEMI-
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 119-124 (1976) (noting seventeen percent growth in class 
action filings, alongside only eleven percent growth in civil filings). 
42 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, 92D CONG., STAFF REVIEW OF CLASS ACTION 
LEGISLATION (Comm. Print 1972) (creating the first empirical study of class action litigation). 
43 See Addresses Presented at the Pound Conference, National Conference on the Causes of 
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice: Volume 1, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 
http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/ctadmin/id/1245 [https://perma.cc/28GW-ZCHE] 
(discussing progress that led to the 1976 state of administration of justice and goals that had yet to be reached). 
44 See Memorandum from Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Class Action Bill (May 30, 1978) (on file at Meador 
Papers, supra note 24, MSS 82-3e, Box 7). 
45 Hearings, supra note 20, at 8. The best overview of the various stages of the process is Berry, 
supra note 18, at 322 n.155. It began with the circulation of a “discussion memorandum” to legal 
analysts, commentators, judges and practicing attorneys, who were then summoned to Washington 
to comment. This was done in more than thirty consultative sessions. Id. The results of these sessions 
were then combined with those of an Advisory Committee survey circulated to 1,800 judges, 
practitioners, and law professors, leading to the circulation of 1,000 copies of the draft bill in 
December 1977 draft. Id. That draft then underwent substantial revisions prior to the submission of 
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in their entirety Rule 23(b)(3)’s provisions for damages class actions and 
replaced them with two distinct statutory procedures: a novel public “penalty 
action” focused on deterring conduct in situations where a large number of 
people suffered injury in relatively small individual amounts; and a “class 
compensatory action” for the “money cases,”46 as some called them, that 
provided a revamped class remedy to compensate individuals who had 
suffered more substantial economic injuries.47 
The first, “public action” side of the regime, was the more radical of the two. 
It vested a single, exclusive claim in the United States for recovery of damages 
or excess profits resulting from a statutory violation, subject to two limitations. 
First, public actions were limited to claims under federal commercial laws 
targeting “conduct in the manufacture, rental, distribution, or sale of realty, 
goods or services, including securities.”48 This included, above all, the federal 
antitrust and securities laws, but also at least seventy other provisions of the 
federal code, such as the recently enacted Truth in Lending Act.49 However, 
claims relating to “wages, hours, other terms or conditions of employment or 
discrimination in employment” were specifically excluded.50 Second, a “public 
action” could lie only where at least 200 or more persons suffered damages in an 
amount less than $300 each.51 Because no such claim was independently 
marketable and any individual payout was likely to be small, the public action’s 
principal goals were “to prevent unjust enrichment” and “deter others from 
similar conduct.”52 Compensation would be a “secondary purpose.”53 
 
S. 3475 in August 1978. See Hearings, supra note 20, at 21. As noted below, after the 95th Congress 
ended, a new draft proposal was incorporated into H.R. 5103, the Small Business Judicial Access 
Act, and submitted to the 96th Congress. Berry, supra note 18, at 322 n.155. 
46 Hearings, supra note 20, at 2, 4-5. 
47 See Office for the Improvement in the Admin. of Justice, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Effective 
Procedural Remedies for Unlawful Conduct Causing Mass Economic Injury: Summary of Draft Proposal 
(Dec. 1, 1977) (on file at Meador Papers, supra note 24, MSS 82-3b, Box 9, Folder: “General 
Background Memoranda Regarding Class Actions 1977”) (describing the statutory proposal that 
creates a procedure “to compensate individuals, through a class remedy, for their substantial 
economic injuries”). 
48 S. 3475, 95th Cong. § 3001(a) (1978). 
49 See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Clearance Binder app. B, tbl. I: Illustrative Federal Statutes 
Forming the Basis for the Public Action (June 1978) in the Subject Files of the Assistant Attorney 
General, Drew Days III, 1977–1981 (on file at National Archives, RG60 (“General Records of the 
Department of Justice”), Box 85, Folder: “DOJ—Office for Improvements in the Administration of 
Justice—Revisions in Fed. Class Damage #130”) [hereinafter Days Files] (listing the “federal 
statutes providing private rights of action for damages arising out of the manufacture, distribution, 
or sale of goods or services, § 3001 (a)”). 
50 S. 3475 § 3001(a). 
51 S. 3475 §3001(a)(1). 
52 Hearings, supra note 20, at 310 (report of the Office for Improvement in the Administration 
of Justice, Proposed Revisions in Federal Class Damage Procedure: Senate Bill 3475 Bill Commentary). 
53 Id. 
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The procedural core of the public action radically fused Meador’s 
programmatic and institutional preoccupations by creating a “qui tam” 
mechanism much like the present-day False Claims Act. Public actions could be 
brought by the United States, but they could also be brought by private 
plaintiffs, dubbed “relators,” who would earn an “incentive fee” of up to $10,000 
(roughly $40,000 in today’s terms) for their labors.54 In return, relators would 
be subject to “a large measure of screening authority and control” by the 
Attorney General.55 Upon private commencement of a public action, the 
Attorney General would review the case and exercise one of a series of 
gatekeeper options: (i) allow the private relator to proceed with the action on 
behalf of the United States; (ii) take over the case or prosecute it in cooperation 
with the private relator; (iii) ask the court to dismiss the case as inconsistent 
with the public interest; or (iv) refer the case to a state attorney general.56 In the 
latter case, a state attorney general receiving a referral would have options 
similar to her federal counterpart: stay out, take over, or ask the court to dismiss. 
Importantly, in all cases, whether or not there was assumption of control, federal 
and state attorneys general retained a veto over any proposed settlement.57 The 
end result was a “meshing of private initiative and public enforcement”58 that 
brought “the executive branch of Government into the picture”59—and placed 
the DOJ in particular at the center of the litigation process.  
Lastly, while compensation remained a sideshow in public actions, the 
proposal nonetheless created a novel mechanism for distributing what would 
be a stream of de minimis payouts. It did so by establishing a “Public Recovery 
Fund,” with payouts to be administered by the Administrative Office for the 
United States Courts and unused funds and “overages” to escheat to the 
federal treasury.60 The proposal thus placed the time- and resource-intensive 
process of locating injured parties and making payments “outside the courts 
themselves,”61 thus “relieving Federal courts of functions for which they are 
 
54 S. 3475 § 3005(b). 
55 Hearings, supra note 20, at 8 (statement of Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen. of the United 
States and Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
56 S. 3475 § 3002(b)(1)-(4). 
57 S. 3475 § 3026(b) (“In a public action brought on relation . . . . [t]he court may approve a 
proposed settlement and enter judgment only with the consent of the United States.”). 
58 Hearings, supra note 20, at 322 (report of the Office for Improvement in the Administration 
of Justice, Proposed Revisions in Federal Class Damage Procedure: Senate Bill 3475 Bill Commentary). 
59 Id. at 8 (statement of Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen. of the United States and Daniel J. 
Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
60 Id. at 31, 36 (statement of Hon. Walter R. Mansfield, United States Circuit Judge, Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals). 
61 Id. at 23 (statement of Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen. of the United States and Daniel J. 
Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
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ill equipped.”62 Perhaps more importantly, the mechanism “simply bypassed,” 
as Attorney General Bell put it in testimony before Congress, the problem of 
opt-in versus opt-out and, with it, the “troublesome and expensive” process 
of providing notice to absent class members after class certification but before 
a liability determination.63 
The OIAJ proposal’s second track—the “class compensatory action”—was a 
less radical departure from existing practice but still called for the substantial 
overhaul of existing rules. As with public actions, class compensatory actions 
would have to meet strict size prerequisites—at least forty persons suffering 
damages in excess of $300 each.64 But this proposal was not limited to consumer 
actions like in the public action side of the regime. Rather, the procedure applied 
to any federal statute providing for a civil cause of action.65 A few parts of Rule 
23 were preserved, including judicial approval of settlements, but gone were the 
requirements of typicality, superiority, and predominance. These, Meador 
argued, had proven to be “litigation breeder[s]”66 and mostly just “arm[ed] 
defendants with dilatory devices,”67 and with little countervailing benefit.68 
Replacing these requirements was something between Rule 23’s “commonality” 
requirement and the less demanding joinder test: that the injuries arise from the 
same transaction(s) or occurrence(s); and that there be a “substantial question” 
of law or fact in common.69 More bracingly, the proposal vested the judge with 
discretion to determine whether the class would take the form of an opt-in or an 
opt-out class action or even a “mixture” of the two,70 a striking deviation from 
the post-1966 practice of opt-out only.71 Lastly, the bill tasked defendants, not 
 
62 Id. at 40 (statement of Hon. Walter R. Mansfield, United States Circuit Judge, Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals). 
63 Id. at 5, 23 (statement of Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen. of the United States and Daniel J. 
Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States). See also Bill Commentary: The Case for Comprehensive 
Revision of Federal Class Damage Procedure (July 25, 1979) (on file at Meador Papers, supra note 24, MSS 
82-3b, Box 9) (“Since the theory of the public penalty action is that there is a single claim for the 
penalty vested in the United States, there is no requirement—and no need—for notice to all persons 
who have been injured to ensure that, out of fairness, they are adequately represented.”). 
64 S. 3475 § 3011(a)(1). 
65 S. 3475 § 3011(a). 
66 Hearings, supra note 20, at 14 (statement of Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen. of the United 
States and Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
67 Id. at 24. 
68 Id. at 14 (noting “predominance” in particular led well-heeled defendants to send legions of 
“young law associates into the library” to dream up uncommon issues). 
69 Id. at 24. 
70 S. 3475 § 3013(e) (“At or immediately after the preliminary hearing the court in its 
discretion shall determine whether some or all injured persons will be excluded from or included in 
the class only if they so request by a specified date.”); see also Hearings, supra note 20, at 23 (describing 
the trial judge’s discretion over the opt-out rule in S. 3475). 
71 S. 3475 § 3013(e). See also Dodson, supra note 18, at 175-87 (recounting the post–1966 
evolution of the opt-out approach). 
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plaintiffs, with making reasonable efforts to identify injured parties and giving 
notice of a liability finding, thus reversing the Supreme Court’s then-recent 
holding in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin72 that plaintiffs must pay for the 
machinery of locating names. 
A further set of provisions aimed to streamline both the “public action” 
and “class compensatory action” sides of the regime. Thus, the proposal 
sought to address concerns about delays and costs by creating a system of 
“phased management.” This included a requirement that a “preliminary 
hearing” be held within 120 days of filing at which the court would take a 
tentative look at the merits—after tightly controlled discovery—to ensure 
statutory prerequisites were met and that the case raised “sufficiently serious 
questions going to the merits.”73 The proposal thus foreshadowed the 
Supreme Court’s recent decisions, most notably in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes,74 moving the merits inquiry forward in litigation time, an idea that 
was then gaining traction.75  
The proposal also sought to strike a balance between drawing lay and 
lawyerly talent into the litigation system and avoiding unjustified payouts to 
“strike suitors.”76 On the public action side of the regime, the “incentive” fee 
a successful relator could earn was aggressively capped at $10,000, thus 
deflecting the concern that the system would become a haven for the 
“‘professional private plaintiff,’ i.e., persons who would go around finding and 
then bringing these types of suits as a means of making a living.”77 
Interestingly, the proposal also barred relator’s counsel from taking a 
contingent slice of incentive fees by mandating that they “shall be paid directly 
to the relator and may not be paid directly or indirectly to [his] attorney.”78 
 
72 417 U.S. 156, 179 (1974) (“[T]he plaintiff must pay for the cost of notice as part of the 
ordinary burden of financing his own suit.”). 
73 S. 3475 § 3013(b)(2); Memorandum from Daniel J. Meador to Griffin B. Bell, Management 
Provisions in Class Action Statute 2 (May 31, 1978) (on file at Meador Papers, supra note 24, MSS 
82-3e, Box 7). 
74 See 564 U.S. 338, 351-52 (2011) (holding that a “rigorous analysis” of the Rule 23 
requirements at the certification stage may require some “overlap with the merits”). 
75 See Responses to the Rule 23 Questionnaire of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, supra note 
41, at 24 (noting that 51 percent of lawyers and 77 percent of federal judges favored a merits hearing 
prior to certification); DuVal, supra note 39, at 1305-07 (showing the relative success of plaintiffs and 
defendants in antitrust class litigation on motions to dismiss); Developments in the Law—Class 
Actions, supra note 39, at 1418-38 (reviewing criticism of holding preliminary hearings on merits 
questions in resolving certification motions). 
76 Hearings, supra note 20, at 30 (statement of Hon. Walter R. Mansfield, United States Circuit 
Judge, Second Circuit Court of Appeals). 
77 Id. at 435 (testimony of Jerome J. Cate, Chief, Antitrust Enforcement Bureau, Montana 
Department of Justice). 
78 S. 3475 § 3005(a)(2). 
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A balance between “legalized blackmail” and “legalized theft,” as Senator 
DeConcini labeled unjust rewards reaped by plaintiffs and defendants, 
respectively,79 was also sought in the proposal’s attorney’s fee provisions. In 
cases in which counsel was entitled to a fee award under the statute providing 
the cause of action, fees would be calculated using a risk-adjusted lodestar 
approach, with a customary “hourly rate” subject to a multiplier depending 
on whether the action piggybacked on a prior public or private action, and 
also whether the work was performed before or after the preliminary 
hearing.80 A separate provision vested the court with substantial discretion to 
reduce the fee award upon a finding that it was “unreasonably large relative 
to the size of recovery.”81 To Meador’s mind, the proposal thus left room for 
“much judicial judgment,” but also inscribed a “rational, uniform, national 
approach” as against the “erratic treatment” that too often prevailed across 
districts and district judges around the country.82 
III. TURF BATTLES 
As Senate Bill 3475 wended its way through Congress and moved to full-scale 
committee hearings in November 1978, the many challenges to its passage quickly 
came into focus. Constitutional concerns were clearly a liability. The most 
prominent centered on the proposal’s elimination of notice requirements in 
public actions. Some commentators, like Judge Mansfield of the Second Circuit, 
suggested that the lack of notice requirements in public actions violated “the basic 
tenets of due process” and would be vulnerable in a challenge before the Supreme 
Court under the Mullane line of cases.83 Others, backed by the Office of Legal 
Counsel, took the view that the weight of authority was against any absolute 
notice requirement. Instead, it was adequacy of representation, not notice, that 
was the “constitutional sine qua non with respect to the binding effect of a class 
action judgment on absent class members.”84 
 
79 Hearings, supra note 20, at 2 (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini). 
80 S. 3475 § 3027(e) (providing for a multiplier of 1.75 in piggyback cases and between 1.75 
and 3 depending on whether the work was performed before or after a preliminary hearing); see also 
Hearings, supra note 20, at 362 (Department of Justice commentary on Senate Bill 3475, proposed 
revisions in Federal Class Damage Procedures) (noting that counsel would thus earn a higher risk 
premium for work performed prior to a preliminary hearing, when the outcome was less certain, and 
a lower risk premium for work that was parasitic on others’ efforts or after a preliminary hearing 
made the outcome more certain). 
81 S. 3475 § 3027(e). 
82 Hearings, supra note 20, at 10 (statement of Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen. of the United 
States & Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
83 Id. at 32, 41 (statement of Hon. Walter R. Mansfield, United States Circuit Judge, Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals). 
84 See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Clearance Binder app. C: Memorandum from John M. Harmon, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Daniel J. Meador, Assistant 
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The hearings also made abundantly clear that the proposal would suffer, 
as is often true in litigation politics more generally, from a basic lack of 
empiricism. Most of the available evidence on class actions took the form of 
surveys of judges and lawyers—a source that, as Judge Mansfield noted in his 
testimony, was “less than decisive.”85 Even basic questions regarding the 
proportion of class action filings asserting damages claims as opposed to 
injunctive or other equitable relief, or the proportion of class suits brought by 
consumers as opposed to small businesses, remained frustratingly elusive.86 
The empirical vacuum meant that the debate could easily slip into hyperbolic 
rhetoric built upon “cosmic anecdotes,” in Arthur Miller’s colorful wording, 
rather than hard facts.87 
An even greater source of friction was pervasive anxiety about which 
institution—the Advisory Committee, as authorized by the Enabling Act, or 
Congress—should take the lead in reforming Rule 23. Few could disagree 
with the legal conclusion offered by Judge Mansfield that parts of Senate Bill 
3475, particularly its penalty provisions, were “substantive” within the 
meaning of the Enabling Act’s anti-modification proviso and so could only 
pass into law “through direct legislative enactment rather than through the 
rule-making route.”88 But it had also been clear to Meador from the start that 
broader questions of institutional role could substantially impair the 
proposal’s chances of passage by creating opportunities for deflection and 
delay. An early OIAJ strategy memo stressed the need to gain the Advisory 
Committee’s approval of the proposal or else to convince it to stand down 
from its own efforts around Rule 23, which had begun to coalesce around 
concrete, but less thoroughgoing, reform proposals.89 The “Committee will 
 
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Class Action Proposal—Request for Opinions on Constitutional 
Questions 2 (May 31, 1978) (on file at Days Files, supra note 49, Folder: “DOJ—Office for 
Improvements in the Administration of Justice—Revisions in Fed. Class Damage #130”). Another 
constitutional question centered on the public action’s approach to calculating damages which, by 
permitting “generalized proof” of damages or excess profits, approximated a “fluid recovery” 
approach and so was, according to some, of “debatable” constitutionality under the Court’s Due 
Process jurisprudence. Hearings, supra note 20, at 253, 259 (statement of Mark I. Harrison, Attorney, 
Phoenix, Arizona) (noting that “the concept of ‘fluid class’ recovery” was “still very much in doubt” 
(citing 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 1.43)). 
85 Hearings, supra note 20, at 36 (statement of Hon. Walter R. Mansfield, United States Circuit 
Judge, Second Circuit Court of Appeals).  
86 Id. at 382-83 n.11 (statement of Beverly C. Moore, Jr.) (arguing that the Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts “could significantly clarify” the debate by refining “its data collection 
procedures” to distinguish between damages and injunctive class actions). 
87 Id. at 162 (statement of Arthur R. Miller, Professor, Harvard University Law School). 
88 Id. at 36 (statement of Hon. Walter R. Mansfield, United States Circuit Judge, Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals). 
89 See Memorandum from Stephen Berry, Office for Improvements in the Admin. Of Justice, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Timetable for Introduction of 
Administration Class-Action Proposal 5 (July 29, 1977) (on file at Meador Papers, supra note 24, MSS 
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have to be advised,” Meador wrote, but “should be tactfully informed that, 
unless it is able to act quickly to approve or amend our draft, the 
Administration will move directly to the congressional arena and bypass the 
Enabling Act.”90 
Meador only partially succeeded in his effort to manage the Advisory 
Committee. Pitching his class action proposal to the Committee beginning 
in late 1977, Meador quickly realized their opposition would be more 
jurisdictional than substantive. Leading the charge among Committee 
members was D.C. District Judge Louis Oberdorfer, who took the view that, 
while the proposal’s penalty provisions could be handled by legislation, other 
elements of it—including provisions governing settlement, preliminary 
decisions, and timetables—were “more properly classified as rule-making” 
and “should be handled by rules.”91 Better, Oberdorfer further argued, for the 
DOJ to make a pair of proposals, one to Congress and another “to the Rules 
Committee for changes in the rules which they think the amendment in the 
law would indicate or require.”92 Committee member Earl Kinter, former 
chief of the Federal Trade Commission and a leading D.C. defense lawyer, 
put the point even stronger, stating he was “not prepared to yield so quickly 
to the jurisdiction of Congress in an area that belongs to rule-making through 
the expertise of lawyers and judges.”93 Even those who supported the DOJ’s 
proposal, including Ninth Circuit Judge Shirley Hufstedler, lamented that 
the DOJ had not even been made aware of the Committee’s “lengthy 
deliberations” on how to revise Rule 23.94 
Meador persevered and managed to convince the Committee’s members, 
over the objections of three dissenters, to recommend that the Judicial 
Conference issue a pronouncement approving the abstract proposition that 
Rule 23(b)(3) revisions should come through legislative enactment rather 
than through rulemaking.95 However, when the Judicial Conference’s 
statement finally came some five months later, it was less than full-throated 
 
82-3e, Box 7) [hereinafter Timetable Memo]. For a flavor of the debate within the Advisory 
Committee about how to revise Rule 23, including the question of opt-out versus opt-in and the 
propriety of a preliminary merits decision prior to class certification, see Advisory Comm. on Civil 
Rules, Minutes of the May 23, 1977 Meeting 1-12 (May 23, 1977), http://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/fr_import/CV05-1977-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQ8V-TAQW]. 
90 Timetable Memo, supra note 89, at 5. 
91 Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, Minutes of the December 12-13, 1977 Meeting 5 (Dec. 12-13, 1977), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV12-1977-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FV8-QBAQ]. 
92 Id. at 9. 
93 Id. at 6. 
94 Id. at 11. 
95 Id. at 13; see also Memorandum from Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rules Advisory Committee—Class 
Action Proposals (Nov. 14, 1977) (on file at Meador Papers, supra note 24, MSS 82-3e, Box 7) (noting 
the Committee’s agreement to support the idea of legislative enactments). 
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in support of Congress piloting class action reform alone. The Conference’s 
statement approved revisions to Rule 23 via “legislative enactment, rather 
than by the rule-making authority.”96 However, it went on to note that the 
Conference was “reserving for further consideration the merits of any specific 
statutory proposals and the appropriateness of dealing with specific aspects 
of such proposals through the rule-making authority.”97 
Without the Judicial Conference’s full endorsement, the issue of 
institutional role arose repeatedly throughout the congressional hearings and 
created two kinds of costs. The first, as Meador had worried, was deflection 
and delay. The General Counsel of the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts at the time, Carl Imlay, led off his testimony with an appeal that 
Congress slow down and seek judicial input. “I would like to urge,” he began, 
“that the recommendations of the Judicial Conference be invited on this bill.”98 
Even better, Imlay continued, because of Senate Bill 3475’s “quite broad 
implications for the administration of justice in the courts,” Congress should 
first, before taking any action, step back and think hard about “how much of 
the class action rule 23 should be in the form of substantive legislation and 
how much should be left to the rulemaking authority of the courts.”99 
Perhaps more importantly, the parade of testimony about substance versus 
procedure and the proper bounds of the legislative and judicial roles created 
friction by adding heft to an already heated debate about whether Rule 23 
required incremental or wholesale revision. Many argued, as had Meador, that 
comprehensive reform was necessary. “Patches and pieces are not going to 
suffice here,” noted Maurice Rosenberg of Columbia Law School.100 
Moreover, because a “comprehensive and integrated” overhaul was in order, 
“congressional legislation, not third-branch rulemaking” was “the proper 
instrument of reform.”101 But just as many argued to the contrary and 
specifically invoked the rulemaking process as the better course. “The changes 
that are warranted,” the National Association of Manufacturers argued, “can 
be achieved through the ordinary mechanism that Congress has established 
for revision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”102 What was needed 
 
96 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 33 (Mar. 9-10, 1978), http://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/1978-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6VT-77JC]. 
97 Id. 
98 Hearings, supra note 20, at 147 (statement of Carl H. Imlay, General Counsel, Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts and Lisa Kahn, Attorney). 
99 Id. at 147-48. 
100 Id. at 170 (statement of Maurice Rosenberg, Professor on Leave, Columbia University 
School of Law). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 116 (statement of Philip A. Lacovara, Attorney, representing National Association of 
Manufacturers, Business Roundtable). 
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instead, the Association argued, was a “sharpshooter approach that deals with 
some actual abuses or inadequacies,” not “wholesale legislative 
dismemberment of Rule 23.”103 None of Rule 23’s problems, the Business 
Roundtable added, were “so severe that they cannot be surgically repaired by 
the Supreme Court under its existing power to amend the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure[].”104 
IV. AN UNRULY CHORUS 
Each of these issues produced substantial headwinds and almost certainly 
made the political sales job—always a challenge for a sweeping reform—that 
much harder. But as the hearings drew to a close and Meador’s team huddled 
about next steps, a further dynamic in evidence over the two days of 
testimony loomed larger than any of these: the surprising extent to which the 
class action proposal scrambled the usual interest-group landscape on 
litigation issues and activated a new set of actors within the system. 
At the time Meador and his team drew up plans back in 1977, they were 
under no illusions that their radical Rule 23 replacement would shift benefits 
and burdens in ways that generated substantial pushback. “This is not a 
plaintiffs’ bill, or a defendants’ bill, or a judges’ bill,” Meador proclaimed in 
the opening minutes of the hearings.105 Virtually every piece of the proposal, 
Meador said, would “dislodge some favored economic position enjoyed either 
by clients or by lawyers today under the existing procedures.”106 And yet, much 
of the drafting process had been devoted to striking a balance between a 
narrowly framed pair of interests. An OIAJ strategy memo written by one of 
Meador’s deputies at the very beginning of the process was representative: 
Class action reform could not pass unless it could navigate between “the 
‘liberal-plaintiff ’ and ‘conservative-defendant’ groups.”107 “Any bill tilted too 
far to meet the concerns of one of these groups,” the memo continued, “can be 
blocked by the other, given the even legislative balance of lobbying forces.”108 
If this was their goal, then Senate Bill 3475 was, without question, 
exquisitely crafted. The plaintiffs’ bar would take a haircut via the proposal’s 
tight regulation of attorney’s fees, thus making it harder for some plaintiffs to 
 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 132. 
105 Id. at 25 (statement of Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen. of the United States and Daniel J. 
Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
106 Id. at 9. 
107 Memorandum from Stephen Berry, Office for Improvements in the Admin. of Justice, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Timetable for Introduction of 
Administration Class-Action Proposal 1 (July 29, 1977) (on file at Meador Papers, supra note 24, 
MSS 82-3e, Box 7). 
108 Id. 
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find willing counsel.109 And the proposal eliminated certain types of 
potentially lucrative class actions outright: Because public actions were limited 
to certain federal commercial statutes, and compensatory class actions to 
federal-law claims greater than $300, the proposal’s complete substitution for 
Rule 23(b)(3) categorically excluded smaller-damages class actions beyond 
federal commercial statutes and, further, left no hook for diversity-based class 
actions at all.110 In return, however, the proposal would eliminate Rule 23’s 
worst “litigation breeders”—especially “predominance”—thus protecting 
plaintiffs from defense-side dilatory tactics.111 DOJ involvement in cases 
would also operate as a subsidy for private litigation efforts.112 
For many of the same reasons, business also faced a mixed bag. The 
proposal’s streamlined procedures offered defendants protection from 
impositional discovery.113 Rigorous DOJ gatekeeping promised to protect 
defendants from baseless actions, and could also mitigate a principal complaint 
of business at the time: that “reliance on administrative regulation does not 
necessarily protect a business against later judicial imposition of liability.”114 
However, the regime would, as already noted, subsidize private enforcement, 
and it would also, by formalizing agency involvement in private litigation, tend 
to refocus the attention of agency officials distracted by other priorities.115 
 
109 Hearings, supra note 20, at 25 (statement of Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen. of the United 
States and Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States) (noting that proposal was 
designed to “curtail some of the expansive and unjustified entrepreneurial activities of some lawyers”). 
110 Id. at 164, 166 (statement of Arthur R. Miller, Professor, Harvard University Law School). 
See also id. at 497 (statement of Allan D. Vestal, Carver Professor of Law, University of Iowa College 
of Law) (“If cases excluded are to be heard, the state courts will be the only forum available.”). 
111 See Hearings, supra note 20, at 24 (statement of Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen. of the 
United States and Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States) (noting that the 
proposed bill “would eliminate certain litigation breeders now found in Rule 23(b)(3)”). 
112 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 20, at 157 (statement of Carl H. Imlay, General Counsel, 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts and Lisa Kahn, Attorney) (noting that the 
“Government,” by maintaining a public action, would be “heavily subsidizing” private litigation “by 
furnishing attorneys and investigators and paying for the other costs of litigation”). 
113 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 20, at 41-42 (statement of Hon. Walter R. Mansfield, United 
States Circuit Judge, Second Circuit Court of Appeals) (noting concern that the threat of “endless 
pretrial discovery” would lead defendants to settle meritless cases and explaining how Senate Bill 
3474 would address those concerns). 
114 Memorandum from Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads 
of Offices, Boards & Divisions, Proposed Class Action Legislation 2-3 (Dec. 2, 1977) (on file at 
Meador Papers, supra note 24, MSS 82-3e, Box 7). 
115 See Hearings, supra note 20, at 512 (statement of Winton D. Woods, Professor of Law, 
University of Arizona College of Law) (noting that defense bar is “equally concerned but for the 
reason that the presence of the enforcement resources of public agencies may result in more efficient 
enforcement”). See also David Ignatius & Stan Crock, U.S. Plan to Revamp Class-Action Rules Could 
Be Costly for Corporate Violators, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 1978, at 8 (noting business groups’ fear that 
the proposal would “cost them money” and “add to their legal headaches”). 
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What was surprising to Meador and his team as political debate heated 
up was the degree to which patterns of support and opposition did not cleanly 
map to their “liberal-plaintiff” and “conservative-defense” view of the world, 
particularly when it came to the DOJ-gatekeeper provisions at the public 
action’s core. DOJ control rights had, from the start, drawn predictable 
opposition from consumer and public interest groups. “[H]istory 
demonstrates,” the most common version of the argument went, “that private 
interest will more adequately and vigorously protect their own interests than 
will the Government.”116 Only “vigorous private sector involvement,” it 
continued, could counter the bureaucratic inefficiencies, inertia, and even 
outright capture that afflicted public enforcers of all stripes.117 So strong were 
the objections of consumer and public-interest groups to an absolute DOJ 
veto over public actions that Meador told Attorney General Bell as the 
proposed bill was finalized in the summer of 1978 that such an approach risked 
losing “the only groups who have supported this bill.”118 It was for this reason 
that the final version of Senate Bill 3475 made DOJ opposition to a case a 
“presumptive basis for dismissal,” but left the ultimate question of whether 
the action served the public interest to the court.119 This, Meador noted, 
“would still leave the door ajar for private litigation, but would clothe the 
Attorney General with substantial control.”120 
But as the legislative process unfolded, it became clear that the staunchest 
opposition to DOJ control rights came not from consumer- and public-interest 
groups, but from a pair of relatively new entrants to the federal litigation state: 
state attorneys general and federal agencies with independent litigation 
authority. For their part, state AGs vigorously opposed anything that pared 
back their blossoming powers under the parens patriae provisions of federal 
statutes, including the newly enacted Hart–Scott–Rodino Antitrust 
Improvement Act of 1976, which had begun to produce marquee recoveries.121 
 
116 Hearings, supra note 20, at 87 (statement of Bruce Meyerson, Director, Arizona Center for 
Law in the Public Interest). See also id. at 81 (statement of Roger Bern) (arguing that “private 
initiative will be thwarted and innovative theories of enforcement will be squelched if all small claim 
action type cases must be passed by the Justice Department”). 
117 Id. at 87. See also id. at 389 (statement of Beverly C. Moore, Jr.) (noting concern about 
“subtle or direct political influence” on government agencies). 
118 See Memorandum from Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Class Action Bill 1 (Aug. 16, 1978) (on file at 
Meador Papers, supra note 24, MSS 82-3e, Box 6). 
119 Id. at 2. 
120 Id. 
121 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c, 15h (1976) (providing that state attorneys general can bring parens 
patriae actions for money damages on behalf of “natural persons” who have been injured by Sherman 
Act violations). See also Hearings, supra note 20, at 61 (statement of B. Lawrence Theis, First 
Assistant Att’y Gen., State of Colorado) (noting cases brought in Colorado by the state’s attorney 
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At least some of the opposition was pure turf: “I object to the power of any 
authority to take over my lawsuit,” an Alabama assistant attorney general 
exclaimed.122 Another assistant attorney general, from Missouri, darkly warned 
that the public action would lead to “the destruction of the Hart–Scott–Rodino 
parens patriae authority for the State.”123 But behind these claims were also more 
subtle concerns, including that a DOJ veto over the enforcement activities of 
state attorneys general would yield anemic and hidebound enforcement. 
Missouri’s assistant attorney general put it best: “Our office’s experience on just 
a few occasions with the Justice Department has not given any encouragement 
that officials there are receptive to trying new theories, especially where the 
matters involved are politically sensitive.”124 The far better course, the state 
AGs argued, was simple: “[G]ive the relator status to the States.”125 After all, 
Washington’s AG argued, “If State Attorney General Offices are to be relied 
upon to effectively litigate in the public interest, they must be given ‘tools’ 
which are at lease [sic] equal in quality to those of private counsel.”126 
Staunch opposition to DOJ gatekeeping—or even a substantial role for 
state AGs—also came from federal agencies, and for similar reasons. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission was most exercised. Because of the 
SEC staff ’s “experience and expertise” implementing the federal securities 
laws, an agency official testified, “we do not believe that its administration 
and enforcement should be confided exclusively to the Department of Justice 
or alternatively to state Attorney Generals.”127 Law professor John Kennedy 
agreed that the proposal “provides too much authority [to] the Attorney 
 
general that secured large antitrust recoveries); id. at 75 (statement of Kenneth R. Reed, Assistant 
Att’y Gen., State of Arizona) (noting similar cases securing large antitrust recoveries in Arizona). 
122 Hearings, supra note 20, at 67 (statement of Thomas Zieman, Assistant Att’y Gen., State 
of Alabama). 
123 Id. at 62 (statement of Roger Bern, Assistant Att’y Gen., State of Missouri). 
124 Id. at 81 (statement of Roger Bern, Assistant Att’y Gen., State of Missouri). Interestingly, 
while Mr. Bern decried public interference with “private initiative,” he seemed to put his office in 
the latter, “private” category. Id. at 63. In keeping with Maggie Lemos’s framing of the issue, state 
attorneys general saw themselves as closer to entrepreneurial private litigants than to sclerotic 
federal agencies. See generally Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative 
Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486 (2012) (describing the similarities between 
actions by state attorneys general and class suits by private attorneys). 
125 Hearings, supra note 20, at 66 (statement of Roger Bern, Assistant Att’y Gen., State of 
Missouri); see also id. at 86 (statement of Thomas Zieman, Jr., Assistant Att’y Gen., State of Alabama). 
126 Id. at 454 (statement of Slade Gorton, Att’y Gen., State of Washington). Few challenged 
the position of the state attorneys general save Alan Morrison, who argued with characteristic 
bluntness: “[A] real question arises as to whether there is any utility in retaining the parens action 
if these provisions are enacted. The parens law was viewed by most of its supporters as a stopgap 
measure until meaningful class action reform could be enacted, and therefore its very existence 
should be reexamined in the context of this bill.” Id. at 468 (statement of Alan B. Morrison, Visiting 
Professor, Harvard University Law School). 
127 Id. at 491 (statement of Philip A. Loomis, Jr., Senior Commissioner, Securities and 
Exchange Commission). 
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General”—and that the problem would be best addressed by allowing 
“reference to other Federal agencies other than the Attorney General.”128 
DOJ control rights scrambled the interest-group landscape in an even 
more unanticipated way, revealing rare dissension within the plaintiffs’ bar. 
On most issues, plaintiffs’ lawyers stood united. A good example was the 
proposal’s prohibition on counsel capturing any portion of a relator’s 
incentive fee, which was expressly designed to reduce agency costs by giving 
the relator a stake in case outcomes and thus decentering plaintiffs’ counsel 
as the “principal protagonist” in class litigation.129 But no such unanimity 
prevailed on DOJ gatekeeping. 
For its part, the mainline plaintiffs’ bar adopted a hard line on the DOJ 
role, declaring any “injection of the government as an advocate in private 
litigation” to be “unacceptable.”130 The reason, one commentator noted, was 
the simple concern that “much of the important, and thus remunerative, class 
action litigation will be taken from them.”131 The standard view within the 
plaintiffs’ bar was also well-captured in a report of the American Bar 
Association’s Ad Hoc Committee on Consumer Class Actions that, though 
completed back in 1974, was submitted to the Senate subcommittee as a stand-in 
for the Association’s views on S. 3475. Commenting on the merits of an “agency 
referral” process akin to Meador’s proposal, Beverly C. Moore, Jr., who had 
begun his career working for Ralph Nader before starting his own class action 
firm, wrote: “The existence of numerous, diverse, and independent centers of 
decision-making”—that is, a “pluralistic system” of enforcement—“has served 
our nation well in sustaining the vitality of our system and in checking the 
arbitrary exercise of power.”132 
However, superlawyer Steve Susman—then only thirty-five years old but 
already a member of “the million-dollar club,” as Forbes dubbed a growing 
elite within the plaintiffs’ bar133—made the precise opposite argument. The 
current fee system, Susman argued, incentivized plaintiffs’ counsel to settle 
rather than try cases and was thereby “creating a body of class-action lawyers 
who are second-rate lawyers.”134 Worse, by discounting fees where private 
 
128 Id. at 168 (statement of John E. Kennedy, Professor, Southern Methodist University School of Law). 
129 For the “principal protagonist” locution, see id. at 424 (statement of Paul M. Bernstein, 
Partner, Kreindler & Kreindler). See also Effective Procedural Remedies for Unlawful Conduct 
Causing Mass Economic Injury, Draft Statute with Comment 29 (Dec. 1, 1977) (on file at Meador 
Papers, supra note 24, MSS 82-3e, Box 7) (noting the proposal’s aim of changing the situation in 
which “[l]itigation monetary incentives flow chiefly to the lawyer, rather than to persons injured”). 
130 Hearings, supra note 20, at 418-19 (statement of Paul M. Bernstein, Partner, Kreindler & Kreindler). 
131 Id. at 512 (statement of Winton D. Woods, Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law). 
132 Id. at 388 (statement of Beverly C. Moore, Jr.). 
133 Howard Rudnitsky & Jeff Blyskal, Getting into Those Deep Pockets, FORBES, Aug. 4, 1980, at 59, 62. 
134 Hearings, supra note 20, at 99 (statement of Stephen Susman, Attorney, Houston, Tex. & 
Harry Susman). 
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counsel piggybacked on a government action, the system “put a premium on 
private lawyers not cooperating with the Government.”135 Indeed, the 
principal threat was not a system where the government would step in and 
subvert private efforts—“I am not concerned about the Government 
displacing the private bar,” Susman noted—but rather a system that 
discouraged cooperation and thus failed to leverage unique public and private 
capacities.136 “I do not see why we should go all-private or all-Government,” 
Susman noted in response to questioning.137 “We ought to combine. We ought 
to give both the Government and the private attorneys general an incentive 
to work together on these cases.”138 
V. THE END OF REFORM 
After the ninety-fifth Congress closed without action on Senate Bill 3475, 
Meador and his OIAJ team renewed their push in the ninety-sixth. But the 
new version of the class action reform bill that emerged in April 1979—now 
House Bill 5103—looked very different from its predecessor. 
For starters, the gatekeeper provisions had been transformed to reflect the 
emerging, more pluralistic balance of power within the American litigation 
state. Under the new version of the bill, a public action could be brought “by 
an executive or independent agency of the United States if such agency . . . 
has exclusive authority to seek civil enforcement of the statute giving rise to a 
public action.”139 The SEC, among other agencies, could now bring its own 
public actions without the DOJ’s blessing. The bill’s provisions governing 
referral of privately initiated lawsuits further eroded DOJ control. It provided 
that the Attorney General, “shall refer the action to an agency authorized to 
bring such action.”140 The bill also sought to soften the opposition of state 
attorneys general by allowing the U.S. Attorney General to assume control of 
a privately initiated suit only where the conduct “injured substantial numbers 
in at least ten States.”141 Otherwise, the cases would be under the command of 
the state attorney general where the case was initially filed. Gone, then, was 
the centralizing aspect of the original OIAJ proposal—and, with it, a key part 
of the normative thrust of Meador’s DOJ-centric vision. 
 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 100. 
137 Id. at 104. 
138 Id. 
139 Class Action Bill at § 3001(c)(2)(A) (July 25, 1979) (on file at Meador Papers, supra note 
24, MSS 82-3e, Box 7). 
140 Id. at § 3002(b)(1). 
141 Id. 
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The other change to the new version of the proposal was apparent in the 
name of the bill into which it was inserted: the Small Business Judicial Access 
Act. Meador’s team had early on seen the possibility of luring “plaintiff 
businessmen” as a way to add “critical support” to a winning coalition.142 But 
it had gradually dawned on Meador’s team throughout 1978 that small 
business—which was far more likely to be on the plaintiff than the defense 
side of antitrust actions in particular—“would be the most direct beneficiaries 
of revisions in class damages procedures.”143 The new bill, however, did not 
just treat small business as one more piece of a winning coalition. Small 
business had become the heart of the political strategy: “Small business,” an 
OIAJ memo announced, “will take the lead in supporting this legislation, with 
other constituencies providing background support.”144 Moreover, as the new 
bill title might suggest, class action reform would now be baked into a broader 
“small business package” that included other sops to small business, including 
a provision permitting small businesses to challenge before a magistrate judge 
any fine imposed by a federal agency. This provision was understood to have 
 
142 See Memorandum from Stephen Berry, Office for Improvements in the Admin. of Justice, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Timetable for Introduction 
of Administration Class-Action Proposal 2 (July 29, 1977) (on file at Meador Papers, supra note 24, 
MSS 82-3e, Box 7). 
143 See Memorandum from Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Small Business Access Package (Including Revision 
of Class Damage Procedures); Letters from OIAJ to Representative Brooks and others 1-2 (Jan. 22, 
1979) (on file at Meador Papers, supra note 24, MSS 82-3e, Box 6) (noting that evidence is mounting 
that small businesses “would be the most direct beneficiaries of revision in class damage procedures” 
and that a revised version of the bill as part of a small business package “is starting to pick up 
valuable small business support”); see also Memorandum from Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Att’y 
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Patricia M. Wald, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Class Actions and Magistrate Adjudication of 
Small Business Controversies (Small Business Legislative Package) (Apr. 26, 1979) (on file at 
Meador Papers, supra note 24 , MSS 82-3e, Box 6) (“We have discovered that small business has a 
substantial interest in supporting the bill.”); Memorandum from Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Att’y 
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Vote by Membership 
of National Federation of Independent Business on Class Action Proposal (June 27, 1978) (on file at 
Meador Papers, supra note 24, MSS 82-3e, Box 7) (reporting the results of a National Federation of 
Independent Business survey that forty-three percent of NFIB members favored the class action 
bill, thirty-nine percent opposed, and eighteen percent remained undecided). Interestingly, it was 
not at all clear even during the hearings on Senate Bill 3475 that small business supported class 
action reform. Indeed, one commentator noted that the class action proposal would press small 
business into a “heads-I-win-tails-you-lose” situation because small business would be exposed to 
more lawsuits, and yet their own ability to recover damages would be siphoned off by the government 
and distributed to consumers. Hearings, supra note 20, at 139 (statement of James D. “Mike” 
McKevitt, Attorney, National Federation of Independent Business, accompanied by Frank S. Swain, 
Attorney, NFIB). 
144 See Office for Improvements in the Admin. of Justice, Memorandum: Revision of Class 
Damage Procedure 5 (July 3, 1979) (on file at Meador Papers, supra note 24, MSS 82-3e, Box 25). 
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“nothing to do with class actions” but would “help garner small business 
support for the class action provisions.”145 
Though the newly packaged proposal had more than a whiff of desperation 
about it, the OIAJ team was optimistic they had found the key to passage. The 
strong support of the four major small business organizations—the National 
Small Business Association, the Small Business Legislative Council, the 
National Federation of Independent Business, and the National Oil Jobbers 
Council—provided a unified constituency, something that was lacking in the 
first legislative campaign. The move also seemed a strategic masterstroke 
because of its potential to dampen the hostility of groups like the Chamber of 
Commerce. As an OIAJ memo noted, the new packaging put the Chamber “in 
a rather awkward position” because, while big business dominated its board, 
its membership was more than ninety percent small business. 146 This fact, the 
memo speculated, “could chasten and mute the Chamber opposition.”147 
But the small-business angle in House Bill 5103 would ultimately prove 
no more successful than the earlier effort to enact Senate Bill 3475. Even 
Attorney General Bell, a steady if not passionate voice for class action reform, 
was losing patience with the repackaging. When Bell rejected the addition of 
the provisions authorizing small businesses to challenge agency-imposed fines 
before magistrates out of concern about clogging courts,148 Meador and Pat 
Wald (then a DOJ official but awaiting confirmation to the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals) penned a memo attempting to walk back Bell and preserve 
“one highly visible package” for small business.149 But Bell’s handwritten 
response effectively shut down the entire effort: “I do not have any further 
time to give to this matter. Let it go forward without me.”150 When promised 
additional hearings did not materialize,151 and with time running out on the 
 
145 Memorandum from Phil Jordan, to Judge Bell, Class Action Bill (May 10, 1979) (on file at 
Meador Papers, supra note 24, MSS 82-3e, Box 6). 
146 Office for Improvements in the Admin. of Justice, Memorandum: Revision of Class 
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148 See Memorandum from Phil Jordan, Special Assistant to the Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Daniel Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Class Action Bill (May 14, 
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provision’s “impact on the courts”). 
149 See Memorandum from Daniel J. Meador & Patricia M. Wald, Assistant Att’ys Gen., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Small Business Judicial Access 
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at Meador Papers, supra note 24, MSS 82-3e, Box 25). 
151 See Memorandum from Daniel J. Meador, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Griffin B. Bell, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Class Action Bill (July 9, 1979) (on file at Meador 
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proceed shortly to introduction and schedule a hearing in September.”). 
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ninety-sixth Congress and political winds already blowing toward the Reagan 
Revolution, class action reform once more fizzled. 
VI. LESSONS FOR AMERICAN PROCEDURAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
What can we learn from the defeat of Meador’s class action proposal? 
Political post-mortems are always perilous, especially when trained on a 
single legislative episode. Even with the benefit of the episode’s relative 
recency and an extensive legislative history, we will never be able to say for 
sure why class action reform ultimately failed to gain traction. Still, the 
demise of Meador’s proposal suggests some new, institution-centered 
departures for thinking about the past, present, and future of the class action 
and the procedural political economy that has made and remade it over time. 
One insight that comes out of the story of 1978 is explicitly reformist. As 
the Advisory Committee, the Supreme Court, and Congress consider future 
revisions to the class action system—including proposed amendments to Rule 
23 that are, as of this writing, under review by the Judicial Conference152—they 
should keep alternative institutional structurings firmly in mind. There are, of 
course, caveats here. A reform package as sweeping as Meador’s class action 
overhaul could likely not come from the Advisory Committee or the courts 
alone without running afoul of the Enabling Act’s anti-modification proviso.153 
It is also plain that congressional enactment of anything resembling Senate Bill 
3475 would be even more difficult in today’s political environment than it was 
in the late 1970s, and for reasons that go well beyond the current Washington 
gridlock. Indeed, the plaintiffs’ bar, state AGs, and federal agencies with 
enforcement powers—all among the “hopeless array of conflicting interests”154 
Meador sought to corral—have continued to grow in their sophistication, 
capacities, and political power in the intervening decades.155 This has left the 
American litigation state even more committed to a pluralistic approach than 
it was when Meador and his OIAJ floated their proposal. Finally, even if a 
hybrid public–private approach were politically feasible, some would surely 
disagree as to whether it would be optimal. Witness contentious debate in 
recent years about the False Claims Act’s qui tam mechanism, plainly the 
closest analogue to the “public action” side of Meador’s proposal.156 All that 
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being said, more creative institutional blends of the sort advanced in 1978, 
though largely absent from current legal and policy debate, may ultimately 
prove best able to leverage the class suit’s many virtues while mitigating its 
vices.157 At the least, public–private hybrids like Meador’s proposal should be 
present on any well-rounded menu of reform options going forward. 
The remaining insights that we can take away from the story of 1978 do 
not concern the form the twenty-first century class action might take but 
rather the process that has shaped it over time. First, the demise of Meador’s 
proposal suggests a new frame for thinking about the evolutionary path the 
American class action has traveled: the tension between centralization and 
polyphony in the design of the American regulatory and litigation state. The 
failed class action revolution of 1978 came at a time when the American 
litigation system was splintering into the pluralistic one we now take for 
granted, including a corps of state attorneys general with a democratic 
pedigree and substantial administrative capacity, a vast federal administrative 
state with litigation authority that is mostly independent of the DOJ, and a 
highly sophisticated and politically potent plaintiffs’ bar.158 Realizing this 
helps us to see the degree to which the late 1970s were, as historians like to say, 
a contingent moment. Indeed, the same fragmentation of litigation interests 
that made a hybrid public–private approach attractive to Meador and his 
fellow DOJ revolutionaries as a way to rationalize an increasingly chaotic 
enforcement ecosystem was simultaneously making grand-scale institutional 
reform efforts more politically difficult. Viewed in this light, Meador’s 
proposal may have been the last best chance to slow, halt, or even reverse the 
fragmentation trend. 
This is not to reject existing frames for thinking about the class action’s 
evolution. Dave Marcus has elegantly shown how the class action debate has, 
from the start, been structured around a kind of dialectic between an 
“adjectival” and a “regulatory” account of aggregation procedures.159 Sean 
Farhang’s tracing of the rise of private litigation as a regulatory tool helps us 
to see how a sudden crush of private lawsuits under new federal statutory 
rights generated a range of docket, doctrinal, and political pressures that 
fueled demands for class action reform.160 And Sam Issacharoff and John Witt 
have shown how lawyers in a slightly earlier era jealously guarded their 
prerogatives within a court-centered system, including the class action 
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lawsuit, against administrative invasions.161 The story of 1978 supplements 
each of these accounts by showing how the class action’s development—at 
least at a pivotal moment in the late 1970s—was also importantly shaped by 
a broader debate about whether and how to counter the centrifugal tendencies 
of an American state that was progressively empowering ever more 
institutional actors within the litigation system. 
Second, the story of 1978 offers an opportunity to reflect upon—and perhaps 
even reorient—longstanding debate about the current institutional structure for 
making procedural rules within the American system. At one level, the failure 
of the 1978 reform effort merely underscores longstanding critiques of the 
current system. For instance, for Meador and his OIAJ team, frictions arising 
out of the Enabling Act’s rulemaking process imposed time-consuming hurdles 
and, by stoking debate about whether Congress or the Advisory Committee 
should take the lead, provided legislative opponents with opportunities for 
deflection and delay before Congress. Just as important, the turf battle 
between the DOJ and the Advisory Committee touched off by Meador’s 
proposal may have had substantial long-term effects on Rule 23’s contours. 
Indeed, the Advisory Committee, after standing down from its own efforts to 
amend Rule 23 in deference to Meador’s radical proposal, would not return to 
the field and again consider class actions until 1990,162 and even then limited 
itself to mostly technical revisions. 
Several of the concerns that follow from these examples are not new. 
Many scholars have decried the increasingly narrow ken of the Advisory 
Committee and its growing instinct for the capillary, not the jugular, in 
revising civil procedure rules163—the result, some say, of transparency 
measures in the 1980s that exposed the Advisory Committee to the pull and 
haul of interest-group politics.164 Plenty of others have lamented rising 
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interbranch acrimony between Congress, the Advisory Committee, and the 
courts on procedural questions, beginning most prominently with Congress’s 
veto and replacement of proposed evidence rules in 1973, continuing with the 
interbranch squabble over the Civil Justice Reform Act in 1990, and then 
reaching full blossom with Congress’s mid-1990s sharp intrusions into 
procedural rulemaking with the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and 
Prison Litigation Reform Act.165 Finally, some have criticized the convoluted 
Enabling Act process—with its seven separate steps, involving five different 
bodies166—as breeding inattention among the myriad actors on even basic 
questions, such as the validity of rules under the Enabling Act. “One gets the 
picture,” as Richard Freer has memorably described it, “of a pop fly falling 
between the centerfielder, the shortstop, and the second baseman.”167 
But the failure of class action reform in 1978, by shifting our gaze beyond the 
four corners of the Enabling Act process to more thoroughgoing institutional 
restructurings, helps us to see problems from a wider angle. For instance, much of 
the existing debate about the current civil rulemaking regime treats the Enabling 
Act structure as a targeted delegation of authority subject to back-end Supreme 
Court and Congress veto.168 And this is formally true. But the jurisdictional 
struggle that played out behind the scenes in 1978—bolstered in the years that 
followed by a Congress that has proven ever more inclined to involve itself in 
procedural matters, and a Supreme Court that, some argue, has cynically used case 
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law to amend federal rules outside the Enabling Act process169—suggests that the 
rulemaking system may have come to more closely resemble a wide open, 
polycentric governance regime, with multiple institutional actors exercising 
overlapping authority from independent bases of power. 
This subtle shift in the conception of the current rulemaking regime—from 
targeted delegation to full-blown polycentric system—has a number of 
important implications. Above all, it shapes how we assess the system’s 
performance. It turns us away from questions about the scope of the Enabling 
Act’s delegation or how best to police implementation of its terms—inquiries 
that invariably bottom out in the eternal quest for a principled distinction 
between substance and procedure.170 Instead, viewing the system as at core 
polycentric pushes the inquiry to the systemic level and leads us to more 
squarely ask how, if at all, a rulemaking regime that distributes authority across 
multiple institutional actors differs in the quality or quantity of its outputs 
relative to alternatives. For instance, does the multiple, overlapping authority 
over procedural rules evident in the story of 1978 foster salutary regulatory 
competition? Or does this overlap instead yield the mix of free rider,171 
bystander,172 and “regulatory commons”173 problems that can enervate 
polycentric systems? Put more concretely, has the growing assertiveness of 
Congress and the Court in the rulemaking space sharpened debate and 
improved the system’s rule outputs? Or has the resulting fracture of the 
Enabling Act regime served more as a brake within the system and made it 
even less likely that innovative solutions of the kind advanced in 1978 will 
emerge and gain traction? 
In turn, by teeing up questions like these, the failed revolution of 1978 points 
up the need for more theoretical and empirical work that adopts a wider, 
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institutional perspective on procedural rulemaking. On the theoretical side, the 
tendency among civil procedure scholars to apply a delegation lens has meant 
that much criticism of the Enabling Act has gone forward more or less in isolation 
from a lively debate within the social sciences about the relative costs and benefits 
of different institutional structurings, including polycentric versus monocentric 
governance approaches.174 Institution-level empirical work on the rulemaking 
process is even thinner. A recently published book by Steve Burbank and Sean 
Farhang offers a start at a remedy by unpacking the rulemaking process and, in 
particular, exhaustively mapping the composition of the Advisory Committee 
and its rule output over time.175 Their work has already jump-started a 
conversation about which reform avenues—the Advisory Committee, the courts, 
or Congress—have had the greatest impact in shaping American civil procedure 
in recent decades. But more such work is badly needed. A potentially fruitful line 
of inquiry could drop down to the state level and leverage the fact that states vary 
substantially in their rulemaking systems, with some vesting courts or legislatures 
alone with monopoly rulemaking power, and others, as with the Enabling Act, 
empowering a murky mix of the two.176 State-level variation thus provides a 
rich empirical context in which to test the effect of institutional structure on 
the quantity and quality of procedural rules. Only with more empirical 
inquiry—including efforts to recover standalone episodes like the failed class 
action vision of Meador and his fellow Jacobins at Justice, and also more 
systematic empirical studies across different rulemaking regimes—can we know 
for sure whether a revolution in the civil rulemaking process itself might be worth 
the fight. 
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